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COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DENIED WHERE MASTER AND
SERVANT HELD NOT TO BE IN PRIVITY
Schimke v. Earley
173 Ohio St. 521, 184 N.E.2d 209 (1962)
Plaintiff-administratrix commenced two wrongful death actions to re-
cover for the death of her son who was killed while a passenger in an auto-
mobile that was involved in a collision with two trucks. In the first action
defendants were the truck owners,' and in the second action defendants were
the driver-employees of the truck owners. 2 The first action resulted in a
directed verdict for the truck owners. 3 In the second action the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of the truck drivers on the basis of the defend-
ants' plea of estoppel by judgment.4 The court of appeals reversed the
trial court as to driver Earley, but affirmed the judgments for the truck
owners and the other driver. 5 The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the court
of appeals decision, holding that defendant Earley could not maintain the
defense of estoppel by prior judgment. The court premised its decision on
Earley's testimony that at the time of the collision, he was not in the employ
of the owner whom plaintiff had sued in the prior action.6 The court held
that there was no privity existing between Earley and this employer, and
therefore denied Earley the defense of res judicata. 7 As authority for this
holding, the majority held to be controlling the decision of Quinn v. State
ex rel. LeRoy s which defined the basic principles of res judicata and the
theory of privity, but did not involve issues of derivative liability that were
present in the instant case.
With respect to defendant Shupe, the result of the decision is correct
1 Defendants were the Standard Oil Co., alleged by plaintiff to be the employer of
Shupe, and the Kopp Clay Co., as the alleged employer of Earley.
2 Defendants were Shupe as the driver of the Standard Oil truck, and Earley as the
driver of the Kopp Clay Co. truck.
3 The trial court found that while Shupe was admittedly within the scope of his
employment at the time of the collision, there was no evidence of negligence on Shupe's
part to impute to Standard Oil. With respect to defendant Kopp Clay Co., the court
determined that plaintiff had failed to show that Earley was within the scope of his
employment.
4 The trial court's decision was premised on the prior judgments which were rendered
in favor of the truck owners.
5 Schimke v. Earley, Civil No. 37309, Ct. App. Stark Co., Aug. 22, 1961 (Ohio
unreported).
6 In fact, upon extended cross-examination, Earley continued to testify that at the
time of the collision he was not working for Kopp Clay Co., but rather for Malvern
Flue Lining, Inc., a part owner of the truck. See the court of appeals decision, supra
note 5, where the cross-examination is set forth.
7" Schimke v. Earley, 173 Ohio St. 521, 523, 184 N.E.2d 209, 211. The court of
appeals decision, supra note 5, also premised its reversal of the trial court's directed
verdict for Earley on the lack of privity between Earley and Kopp Co.
8 118 Ohio St. 48, 160 N.E. 453 (1928).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
and in accordance with the overwhelming weight of authority,9 although the
Restatement of Judgments is contra.' 0 However, as Justice Taft points out
in his concurring opinion, the court set a questionable precedent by basing
its decision on the existence of privity between master and servant." It is
unquestioned that the defense of res judicata or estoppel by prior judgment
is based on a theory of privity of interest between two or more persons who
are sued in separate actions on the same issues by the same plaintiff.'2 How-
ever, a number of jurisdictions have ruled that the privity requirement is not
applicable to actions where liability is predicated entirely upon a derivative
relationship, such as respondeat superior.13 Earlier Ohio cases, deciding
issues similar to those in the instant case, reached proper results without
considering the question of privity. In Fightmaster v. Tauber,'4 judgment
was rendered for the defendant employer in the first action, and the plea of
res judicata barred the same plaintiff from bringing an action against the
employee. Where judgment was for defendant furnace company as a princi-
pal in a prior action, the court in Melchion v. Burkart15 held that the same
plaintiff was barred by the prior judgment in a subsequent action against the
agent arising out of the same transaction.
6
The privity theory of the instant case creates a problem when a servant
seeks to recover for personal injuries against a defendant who recovered a
judgment as plaintiff in a prior action against the master. The servant's ac-
tion against the plaintiff in the former action would seemingly be barred by
a plea of res judicata because master and servant are in privity, according to
the theory of the instant case. This result is not proper because the servant
would be denied his day in court to assert his independent rights against one
who may be liable to him.' 7 Even though the theory that a party or his
9 See the numerous authorities cited in Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 710 (1952).
10 Restatement, Judgments §§ 96(2), 99 (1942).
11 Schimke v. Earley, supra note 7, at 523, 184 N.E.2d at 211.
12 Kinkaid v. Smith, 167 F. Supp. 195, 200 (N.D. Ohio 1958); Mansker v. Dealers
Transport Co., 160 Ohio St. 255, 261, 116 N.E.2d 3, 7 (1953); Quinn v. State ex rel.
LeRoy, supra note 8, at 53, 160 N.E. at 455; Clark v. Barnowski, 111 Ohio St. 436, 440,
145 N.E. 760, 761 (1924); Restatement, Judgments § 99 (1942); Comment, 35 Yale
L.J. 607 (1926).
13 King v. Stuart Motor Co., 52 F. Supp. 727 (N.D. Ga. 1943); Spitz v. Bemac
Transport Co., 334 Ill. App. 508, 79 N.E.2d 859 (1948) ; Overstreet v. Thomas, 239
S.W.2d 939 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951) ; Silva v. Brown, 319 Mass. 466, 66 N.E.2d 939 (1946) ;
Miller v. Simons, 239 Minn. 523, 59 N.W.2d 837 (1953); Thirty Pines, Inc. v. Bersaw,
92 N.H. 69, 24 A.2d 84 (1942); Jones v. Young, 257 App. Div. 563, 14 N.Y.S.2d 84
(1939); Kelly v. Curtiss, 16 N.J. 265, 108 A.2d 431 (1954); Taylor v. Denton Hatchery,
Inc., 25 N.C. 689, 111 S.E.2d 864 (1960); Jones v. Valse, 111 Vt. 481, 18 A.2d 179 (1941).
14 43 Ohio App. 266, 183 N.E. 116 (1932).
15 77 Ohio App. 149, 65 N.E.2d 912 (1945).
16 See also Mooney v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 222 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1955);
Melchion v. Burkhart, 54 Ohio L. Abs. 287, 87 N.E.2d 373 (Ct. App. 1948); Masters v.
Brabousky, 27 Ohio N.P. (ns.) 561 (C.P. 1929).
17 Pesce v. Brecher, 302 Mass. 211, 19 N.E.2d 36 (1939); Good Health Dairy Prod-
ucts Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 15, 9 N.E.2d 758, 759 (1937).
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privies cannot twice litigate the same issues against an identical opponent is
accepted,' 8 the servant who brings an action against the party who recovered
against the master should not be barred by the prior judgment since the
party-plaintiff is not identical. A servant does not have such privity of in-
terest with his master, nor does the master have such an interest that he can
sue for his servant's personal injuries. This cause of action is peculiar to the
servant, and the master does not have power to bind his servant as the serv-
ant's only interest in the prior action against his master was one of the
derivative relationship. 19 Courts have generally ruled that both master and
servant should be able to maintain separate actions against a defendant for
personal injuries and property damages, respectively, arising out of the same
transaction.20
Applying the privity theory of the instant case, a similarly improper
result could occur where an employer sues a defendant for damage to a
vehicle which his employee was driving. If the employer prevailed in such
an action, and the employee then sued the same defendant for personal in-
juries arising out of the same occurrence, a privity of interest theory would
seemingly permit the employee to assert the prior judgment against the de-
fendant, at least with respect to the issues of defendant's negligence and of
plaintiff's contributory negligence. In such an action, plaintiff-employee
would be asserting a cause of action personal to himself, and one which was
not litigated in the prior and different action of the master.2 '
A third problem created by the decision in the instant case arises in the
field of evidence. Ordinarily, a servant's admissions are admissible only as
against himself, and not as against his master.22 If a strict interpretation of
privity between master and servant were followed, it would be held that the
employee's admissions were those of a party-opponent and therefore admis-
sible in an action against the master.
Courts in other jurisdictions have avoided the problems inherent in a
18 That the Ohio courts have accepted the basic principles of res judicata is well
settled. See, e.g., Mansker v. Dealers Transport Co., supra note 12; Quinn v. State ex rel.
LeRoy, supra note 8.
19 Pesce v. Brecher, supra note 17.
20 Ibid. See also Fightmaster v. Tauber, supra note 14; Elder v. New York and
Penna. Motor Express, Inc., 284 N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d 188 (1940); Gentry v. Farruggia,
132 W. Va. 865, 53 S.E.2d 741 (1949).
21 This issue was squarely before the court in the Elder case, supra note 20, where
after the plaintiff's master had recovered in a property damage cause of action, plaintiff-
servant sued the same defendant for personal injuries. The court held plaintiff could not
assert the prior judgment against defendant, at least when plaintiff was not a party to the
prior action.
22 The basic rule of evidence in this respect is that only statements of a party-
opponent are admissible. See McCormick, Evidence §§ 239, 243 (1954). The Ohio
courts have recognized this evidentiary rule. See, e.g., Voss v. Murrary, 50 Ohio St. 19,
32 N.E. 1112 (1893); Cook v. Slate Co., 36 Ohio St. 135 (1880); Shepson v. Alhambra
Lounge & Restaurant, Inc., 64 Ohio L. Abs. 33, 110 N.E.2d 619 (Ct. App. 1952).
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privity theory and yet have reached proper results.2 3 Most courts have ruled
that there is no privity of interest in the res judicata sense between a master
and his servant, but nevertheless have permitted estoppel by prior judgment
to be asserted defensively by one who was not a party or privy in the prior
action. The reasoning for this exception is that it prohibits a plaintiff who
has had his day in court from relitigating the same issues by suing the master
first, and then suing the servant in a subsequent action.2 4 In the develop-
ment of this exception to the requirement of privity, the technical problem
which the courts had to overcome was the lack of mutuality of estoppel in
such an exception. A basic precept of res judicata has always been that fair
play dictates that one who was not a party to a judgment could not be bound
by such judgment. Therefore, the theory of mutuality holds that a nonparty
should not benefit from a judgment to which he was not a party.25 In the
typical action against a master for his servant's negligence under a respon-
deat superior theory, the servant is not a party to the action, nor is he in
privity with any party. When the same plaintiff sues the servant for the
alleged negligence on which the master in a prior action had recovered a
judgment on the ground that his servant was not negligent, a strict require-
ment of mutuality would not permit the servant's plea of estoppel based on
the prior judgment. The servant was not a party to the prior action and
therefore would not be bound if the judgment had been for plaintiff on the
issue of negligence. An overwhelming number of courts have recognized
the unfairness of such a strict adherence to the requirement of mutuality in
such situations.2 6 The unfairness arises because plaintiff has had his day in
court; he has chosen the forum and the issues to be litigated. To allow the
same plaintiff a second chance to relitigate the same issues is to thwart the
very purpose of res judicata, that of bringing litigation to a timely end. To
say that plaintiff should not be bound in such circumstances merely because
in the second action the party-defendant is not the same as in the prior
action is to unduly rely on an antiquated doctrine which serves no justifiable
end. The Restatement27 limits the defensive use of the prior judgment
against the same plaintiff to situations where the plaintiff's first action is
against the servant. This is not in accord with the rule of the majority of
courts which permits the prior judgment to be asserted against the same
plaintiff whenever the issue of derivative liability has been litigated in the
prior action, no matter whether the defendant in the prior action was the
party primarily or secondarily liable.23  Where an attempt is made in the
23 See cases cited note 13 supra. See also Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust
& Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. App. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), cited and quoted from in the
concurring opinion of the instant case.
24 See, e.g., Bernhard v. Bank of America, supra note 23, at 812-13, 122 P.2d at 895.
25 See, e.g., Restatement, Judgments § 93 (1942); Comment, "Developments in the
Law-Res Judicata," 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 862 (1952).
26 See cases cited note 13 supra; Bernhard v. Bank of America, supra note 23.
27 Restatement, Judgments §§ 96(2), 99 (1942).
28 See cases cited note 13 supra.
1963]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
second action to use the prior judgment affirmatively, instead of defensively,
the authorities are not in accord as to its propriety. Some courts are still of
the opinion that complete strangers to the prior action should not be able to
use affirmatively the prior judgment, especially against the defendant in a
former action since such a defendant did not choose the forum. Most courts
are not willing to completely do away with the requirement of mutuality and
adopt a theory of res judicata premised on the single test of whether a party,
plaintiff or defendant, has had his day in court.29
In the instant decision, plaintiff's first action was against the two em-
ployers; and, since the two driver-employees could not be joined in the same
action,30 they were not parties to that action. When the trial court directed
verdicts for the defendant-employers, the reason employee-Shupe as a non-
party was able to assert a unilateral estoppel3' against plaintiff in the second
action against himself and Earley as employees was not that Shupe was in
privity with his employer, but that the issue of Shupe's negligence had been
fully litigated in the prior action and determined against plaintiff. Assuming
that the trial judge also held that Earley was not negligent in the action
against his purported employer, it would follow that he should have been
able to assert such a finding against plaintiff in the second action even though
the court determined that Earley was not in the scope of defendant Kopp
Company's employment. This is because plaintiff in the former action chose
the forum and had his day in court to litigate the issue of Earley's negligence.
Whether Earley was in privity with any party, or within any party's scope
29 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 132-34, 172 At. 260,
263-65 (1934), where the court abandoned the requirement of mutuality and limited the
requirement of privity to the party against whom the collateral estoppel was asserted,
i.e., a party who had had his day in court.
30 They could not be joined because of Ohio's antiquated rule that parties primarily
and secondarily liable cannot be joined in the same action. French v. Central Construc-
tion Co., 76 Ohio St. 509, 81 N.E. 751 (1907). See also Losito v. Kruse, 136 Ohio St.
183, 24 N.E.2d 705 (1940), where because the Ohio court has maintained its rule against
nonjoinder of master and servant, the court took the position that a plaintiff may bring
separate actions against a master and servant. This holding seems to imply that a master
and servant are not in privity since if they were, a suit against one would be a suit against
both. This situation demonstrates even more clearly that the majority opinion in the
instant case should have considered varied aspects of collateral estoppel, especially the
availability of unilateral estoppel. Perhaps the problems arising from this case are at
least in part attributable to Ohio's nonjoinder rule, since if plaintiff had been able to join
both employers and both employees in one action, no second action would have been
necessary and thus no issues of estoppel by prior judgment would have arisen. This
seems to be another reason why Ohio should end its minority rule of nonjoinder of per-
sons derivatively liable. For a criticism of the Ohio rule, see Wills, "Joinder of Master
and Servant," 23 Ohio St. L.J. 488 (1962).
31 The term "unilateral estoppel" is used to more narrowly define the type of col-
lateral estoppel which the majority of courts permits in derivative liability actions; that
is, an estoppel which is not mutual as to both the party asserting it and against whom it
is asserted.
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of employment, would seem to be irrelevant in the second action where
Earley was a party-defendant. 32
The concurring opinion in the instant case is correct in criticizing the
majority's reasoning. The proper basis for the court's holding was the princi-
ple of unilateral estoppel. With the wealth of case law and commentary ex-
isting on the subject of unilateral estoppel by prior judgment,33 it is difficult
to understand why counsel apparently did not develop this subject in argu-
ment, and why the majority adopted the unsound privity reasoning. If the
issue is again presented, it would be most advisable for the Supreme Court of
Ohio to eliminate the privity reasoning of the instant case, and thus avoid
the problems which are likely to arise from the incorrect application in this
situation.
32 Whether the trial court also decided the issue of Earley's negligence is not dear
from the record. There is some indication in the court of appeal's opinion that the trial
judge did consider this issue, but in view of the court's finding of no agency between
Earley and the Kopp Co., the judgment for Kopp should probably be interpreted only as
an adjudication that Earley was not its employee since once the nonagency was estab-
lished, it was unnecessary for the court to rule on Earley's negligence. Moreover, the
facts of the collision indicate negligence on Earley's part since he was apparently driving
his truck left of the center line of the roadway at the time of the collision. There is no
indication in the record that Earley pursued such a theory of unilateral estoppel, either
at the trial or on appeal.
33 See, e.g., cases cited notes 11-14 supra. See also Thornton, "Further Comment on
Collateral Estoppel," 28 Brooklyn L. Rev. 250 (1962); Collins, "Collateral Estoppel in
Favor of Nonparties," 41 Ore. L. Rev. 30 (1961); Moore & Currier, "Mutuality and
Conclusiveness of Judgments," 35 Tul. L. Rev. 301 (1961); Weinstein, "Revision of Pro-
cedure: Some Problems in Class Actions," 9 Buffalo L. Rev. 433 (1960); Currie, "Mu-
tuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine," 9 Stan. L. Rev. 281
(1957); Polasky, "Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation," 39 Iowa L. Rev.
217 (1954); Comment, "Developments in the Law-Res Judicata," 65 Harv. L. Rev.
818, 861-65 (1952).
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